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EQUAL PROTECTION
US. CONST. amend. MV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
NY CONST. art. I, § I]:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws
of this state or any subdivision thereof No person shall, because
of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination
in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation,
or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
state.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISON
]FOURTH DEPARTMENT
Masi Management Inc., v. Town of Ogden1
(decided June, 16, 2000)
Plaintiff, Masi Management, was a contract vendee of a
fifty-two-acre parcel in the defendant's town of Ogden.2 Masi
alleged that its equal protection rights as set forth in both the
Federal3 and State4 Constitutions were violated when defendant
'273 A.D.2d 837, 709 N.Y.S.2d 734 (4th Dep't 2000).
2 Id., 709 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
3 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
1
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prevented him from developing a parcel of land described in his
application to the town. In addition, Masi maintained that its due
process rights were violated.5 The Appellate Division Fourth
Department affirmed the trial court's decision holding that Masi
failed to demonstrate that the defendant and its officials acted in an
"illegal and malicious manner." 6 The trial court concluded that
Masi's rights under the New York State Constitution and the
United States Constitution 7 were violated. In response to
plaintiffs Due Process Claim, the court held that Masi did not
have sufficient entitlement to "the continuation of the (residential
two family) R-2 designation of the parcel, a permit to build a
duplex unit, or the reclassification of the parcel."8  The court
determined that Masi did not have a valid due process claim
because it failed to show a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
parcel of land for development.
9
Masi's land had been classified as a two family residential
parcel (R-2).10 The Planning Board of Ogden urged Masi to alter
its plan." The planning board suggested that a multi-use project
plan replace the existing plan of rental units with patio homes.
1 2
Soon after, Masi submitted an application to rezone the parcel to
allow "single family homes, patio homes, an apartment complex
and a retail/office building."' After Masi submitted the rezoning
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
4 NY CONST. art., 1 § 1 1 states:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because
of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights by any other person orby any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency
or subdivision of the state.
/d.
5 Masi Management, 273 A.D.2d at 839, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
6 Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
8 Masi Management, 273 A.D.2d at 839, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
9 Id.
10 Id.
' Id. at 837, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
12 Id., 709 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
13 Masi Management, 273 A.D.2d at 837, 709 N.Y.S.2d 734.
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application, a competing developer submitted an application. 14
The competing developer planned to rezone a fifty-acre parcel
from an R-2 classification to a senior citizen housing district
classification. 15 This plan included single family patio homes, for
lease or purchase, and three apartment buildings.'6
Masi wanted to hasten the application process.' 7 To
accomplish this, Masi amended his application to replace the patio
homes with duplex homes.18 The change in the application would
make Masi's application in compliance with the necessary R-2
classification.' 9 Despite the compliance with the R-2
classification, the Town Board denied Masi's application. In
addition, the Town Board eliminated the R-2 classification for the
area, except for two of Masi's parcels. 20 Although Masi's
application conforned to the eliminated R-2 classification,
exceptions were made for parcels owned by a town board member
and the competing developer. 21 Approximately two weeks later,
the Board adopted a law that declared the competing developer's
parcel a senior citizen housing district.
22
Since the Board denied Masi's R-2 application prior to the
elimination of the R-2 classification and did not deny the
competing developer's application to modify R-2 land, plaintiff
alleged that its state and federal equal protection rights were
violated.23  Masi sought reversal of trial court's decision,24
contending that the Board did not want its land developed and
therefore eliminated the R-2 classification. 25 Likewise, Masi stated
that the Board's frustrated procurement of a hearing on its
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assistance to the competing developer. 26 These actions supported
Masi's belief that the Board did not want Masi to develop its
land.27 Masi further alleged that the matrimonial relationship
between the attorney of the competing developer and a board
member supported its allegations that the Board acted maliciously,
with the intent to harm the plaintiff.
28
The court held that Masi did not have a Federal or New
York equal protection constitutional claim.29 The court relied on
the case of In the Matter of 303 West 42nd Street Corporation v.
Klein.30 As in Masi Management, the plaintiff in 303 West 42nd
Street Corporation alleged that the city's Department of Buildings
did not want the plaintiff to build an adult bookstore and two adult
theaters.31  Therefore, the plaintiff claimed the Department of
Building's accusations of fire and safety problems were
discriminatory since the department's previous reviews never
indicated any problems. 32 The defendant explained that it was
trying to eliminate sex shops from the Time Square, New York
neighborhood. Plaintiffs plans became a part of the elimination
process. 33 The court in 303 W. 42nd St. Corp. focused on federal
equal protection rights. They stated that the plaintiff must prove
that the public authority was "applying or enforcing and admittedly
valid law with and evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically





Establishing this claim required the plaintiff to prove that
the law was not applied to others in similar situations and that the
selective enforcement of the law was deliberately based upon race,
religion or another classification. 35 Unlike the court in Masi
Management, the court found that 303 W. 42nd St. Corp. satisfied
26 Id. at 837-38, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 735-36.
27 id.
28 Masi Management, 273 A.D.2d at 839, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
29 Id.
'o 46 N.Y.2d 686, 389 N.E.2d 815,416 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1979).
"' Id. at 690, 389 N.E.2d at 816, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
32 Id. at 691 389 N.E.2d at 817, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
33 Id.
34 Id at 693, 389 N.E.2d at 819, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
3' 303 W 42ndSt., 46 N.Y.2d at 693, 389 N.E.2d at 819, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
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the necessary criteria to establish Federal and State Equal
Protection Claims. 36 In the Matter of 303 W. 42nd St. Corp.
demonstrated that the selective enforcement of the building
regulations were due to the nature of the shop that was being built(a sex shop). 37 The court concluded that, the building regulations
were discriminatorily enforced due to the type of shop.38 In Masi
Management, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the competing
developer and itself were similarly situated, thus undermining that
the plaintiffs claim. 39 The Masi Management court did not have
to analyze any further issues because the plaintiff did not meet its
burden of production.
The New York State constitution entitles equal protection
to all people and guarantees that no person shall be discriminated
against in his civil rights.4n Masi Management alleged that the
Planning Board violated its rights established in the New York
State constitution. 4 1 Masi's allegations for the New York claim
were the same as its allegations for the federal claim. The
allegations included the defendant's intention to prevent Masi from
developing the parcel by eliminating the R-2 classification.42
Next, Masi claimed that defendant interrupted its effort to obtain a
public hearing on its project application. Third, Masi alleged that
the defendant provided misleading information. 43 Masi also alleged
that the Board expedited the competing developer's application but
did not assist Masi.44 Lastly, Masi alleged that the Board acted
36 Id. at 696, 389 N.E.2d at 820, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
37 Id. at 693, 389 N.E.2d at 819, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 224.38 Id. at 696, 389 N.E.2d at 820, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
39 Masi Management, 273 A.D.2d at 839, 709 N.Y.S2d at 736.
40 NY CONST. art. I § 1.1.
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because
of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency
or subdivision of the state.
Id.
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with malicious intent since the attorne € for the competing
developer was married to a Board 
member. 4Z
Despite Masi's extensive list of allegations against the
defendant, Masi understood that New York does not have any
precedent applying the rights and privileges granted by the New
York Constitution in the land use regulation context. 46  The
Supreme Court of the Appellate Division, Fourth department,
refused to create such rights for land regulation cases.
The court looked to the case of Crowl v. Courville in its
analysis of the plaintiffs due process claims. 7 In Crowley, Mr.
Crowley alleged that his constitutional rights were violated based
on a parking variance. The variance was established in 1975, prior
to his purchase of the land.48 The court considered the substantive
due process rights first, because without it the plaintiffs claim is
without merit. 9 The court noted that a claim requires substantive
due process rights before it may be considered. Initially, the court
stated that they carefully review land use cases. They did not want
the federal courts to become an institution that reviews the
constitutionality of local legislative agency decisions arising from
disputes between begrudged parties.50
Due to the court's concern against becoming a property
disputes forum, the court established two elements necessary to
satisfy a due process claim resulting from a property dispute.
Plaintiff must have a valid property interest within the meaning
Constitution and show that the defendant acted in an "arbitrary or
irrational manner in depriving the plaintiff of that property
interest." 51 The Crowley court explained that in order to have a
constitutional property interest, the plaintiff must first have "a
legitimate claim of entitlement."52  Crowley's property did not
meet the constitutional requirements because his claim was based
on a parking variance issued prior to his purchase of the land for a
45 Id.
46 273 A.D.2d at 839, 709 N.Y.S.2d .at 736.
47 76 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1996).
4 8 Id. at 50.
49 See U.S. CONST. amend.V, which provides in pertinent part: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
5o Crowley, 76 F.3d at 52.
51 Id.
52 Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1995).
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office building, not for his planned retail building. Since Crowley
did not have a property interest, it was unnecessary to continue
analyzing whether the defendant acted in a "arbitrary and irrational
manner."
53
Similarly, Masi Management was held to be without a due
process claim. The court's decision was based on the Crowley
decision. Masi did not have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to
the continuation of the R-2 designation of the parcel, a permit to
build duplex units, or the reclassification of the parcel. 54 In
addition, the court in Rivervale Realty Co, Inc. discussed that when
a town board considers many issues, including but not limited to
issues of zoning or application selection, decisions are made at the
board's discretion.
55
New York State courts generally adhere to the rule
developed in 303' W. 42nd St. The rule states that the Equal
Protection Clause requires the plaintiff to show that the law was
not enforced against others similarly situated and that the selective
application of the law was deliberately based upon an
impermissible standard such as race, religion, or some arbitrary
classification. Masi Management did not satisfy this requirement.
They were unable to prove that the board acted with an evil eye
and an unequal hand. Both requirements of this rule were
necessary.
Crowley discussed the Federal Equal Protection Clause on
selective enforcement. Similarly, to the New York rule, the federal
clause applies when "the person, compared with others similarly
situated, was selectively treated; and such selective treatment was
based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent
to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights or
malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. 56
The court in Crowley found that the plaintiff failed to
satisfy these criteria because the treatment established only that
people in similar situations where given different treatment. The
s Id. at 52.
54 Masi Management, 273 A.D.2d at 839, 709 N.Y.S,2d at 736.
55 In the Matter of Riverdale Reality, 565 N.Y.S.2d 583, 170 A.D.2d 762 (3d
Dep't 1991).
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court concluded that different treatment does not automatically
mean that the enforcement was made in bad faith.
Both the federal and state equal protection clauses are very
similar. The federal equal protection clause is more specific than
the New York equal protection clause, but they cover the same
basis for equal protection rights. The federal clause examines the
alleged negative treatment in a more precise manner. The federal
law looks beyond the deliberate acts and breaks the act down into
elements. The Federal equal protection clause by selective
enforcement requires that the aggrieved party was "selectively
treated and that the treatment was based on impermissible
considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the
exercise of constitutional rights or malicious or bad faith intent to
injure a person." 57
New York forbids a public authority from applying
established law "with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances." New York law requires that
both the "unequal hand" and the "evil eye" be proven. Despite the
more intricate and specific wording of the federal statute, the two
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